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 Determination of Money Supply in India: The Great Debate  
 
Rituparna Das 
 
Introduction 
Researchers reported that - there were two approaches to money supply determination in 
India: balance sheet or structural approach and money multiplier approach; the former 
focused on individual items in the balance sheet of the consolidated monetary sector in 
order to explain changes in money supply and the latter focused on the relationship 
between money stock and reserve money; the money multiplier approach emerged 
strongly as a critic to the balance sheet approach; between January 1976 and January 
1978 there was a hot and rich debate between two groups of researchers, one group led 
by Gupta who believed in the money multiplier theory, the other group of RBI 
economists, who were not accepting this theory; the debate gave rise to a number of 
research papers where mostly regression techniques were used to estimate and forecast 
money supply function; Bhattacharya (1972), Gupta (1972) and Marwah (1972) used 
regression techniques to estimate money multiplier in India four years before the debate 
took place. The above debate is narrated below in an analytical style. 
 
The Balance Sheet Approach 
The First Working Group on Money Supply (FWG) introduced this approach. This 
approach comprised the following points: (a) money supply was a liability of the banking 
system and government; (b) inter-bank assets and liabilities did not affect money supply; 
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(c) banks’ borrowings from RBI increased money supply and (d) variation in banking 
systems financial assets minus the variation in its net non-monetary liabilities represented 
the change in money supply, (e) division of the economy into (i) government sector 
comprising central and state governments and (ii) private sector (comprising the rest of 
the domestic sector and the foreign sector) was necessary in order to know which sectors 
caused how much changes in financial assets and net monetary liabilities of the banking 
system; (f) the government sector’s domestic budget deficit on money supply could cause 
an increase in money supply through variations in the financial assets and net non-
monetary liabilities of the banking sector; hence (g) the impact of government sector’s 
deficit in its foreign accounts on money supply was nil; (h) the government sector’s total 
impact on money supply equalled its total budget deficit minus its net purchases of 
foreign exchange from RBI; (i) deficit financing was defined as the total impact on 
money supply of the government sector and to include the changes in RBI’s holdings of 
government securities and treasury bills, banks’ holding of government securities, RBI’s 
foreign exchange assets as a result of the government sector’s net purchase/sale from/to 
RBI, and the banking system’s net non-monetary liabilities as a result of the transactions 
between the government sector and the government’s currency liability to the public; (j) 
an increase/decrease in the banking sectors’ loans and advances to the private sector 
and/or its holdings of private sector’s shares and securities would result in an equivalent 
increase/decrease in money supply and (k) government sector’s direct impact on money 
supply. The government sector’s ability affect money supply directly through changes in 
the treasury balances was also mentioned by academicians like Bhole (1987). 
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Gupta (1976a) 
Gupta (1976a) sharply critiqued the FWG Analysis. He opined that mere balance sheet 
counterparts or accounting equivalents such as those enumerated in Factors Affecting 
Money Supply in Analysis II should not be called the determinants of Money Supply 
(M). Gupta was suspected to get the H theory of M determination from Brunner and 
Meltzer (1964) or Cagan (1965) while the Indian academicians like Gupta (1972) and 
Marwah (1972) were suspected to inspire him.  
 
Mujumdar (1976) 
Mujumdar (1976) was reported to criticize Gupta (1976a) on the following grounds: (a) 
the so called high powered money (h) could be powerless and could lose it’s importance 
in bringing about variations in M had the central bank imposed quantitative credit ceiling 
thereby restricting the power of the banks to expand credit despite their having adequate 
reserves; (b) the multiplier analysis could not explain fully the variations in the secondary 
money whereas the RBI analysis did it; (c) since in the Indian context credit planning was 
an integrated part of development planning over the years RBI should opt for planning 
both of primary money and secondary money than for planning primary money only and 
leave the secondary expansion to work itself out on the basis of multiplier; (d) while RBI 
analysis sought to provide a total explanation of variations in both primary and secondary 
money, the multiplier analysis seemed to ignore the demand side of secondary money. 
 
Khatkhate (1976) 
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Khatkhate, a member of the FWG was reported to come down on both of Gupta (1976a) 
and Mujumdar (1976). Though he appreciated Gupta’s stress on the behavioural relations 
like currency ratio and reserve ratio, but in Khatkhate’s opinion they were not linked up 
with RBI presentation of monetary data. At the same time he differed with Mujumdar on 
the following points: (a) the multiplier analysis was unsatisfactory and mechanistic vis-à-
vis RBI analysis; (b) raising reserve ratio and imposing credit ceiling were different in 
terms of their effects on the multiplier; (c) depending on reserve ratio alone the multiplier 
fluctuates. Khatkhate’s opinion on the above points was as follows: (i) the multiplier 
analysis was not merely a substitute, rather an intrinsic part of RBI presentation; and, (ii) 
raising reserve ratio and imposing credit ceiling were analogous in terms of their effects 
on the multiplier. Khatkhate commented that when reserve ratio was raised or credit 
ceiling was imposed, it was necessary to examine how other components like excess 
reserves ratio, currency ratio etc behaved; there were evidences that even when reserve 
ratio was unchanged or credit ceiling was not imposed or raised, the multiplier changed. 
 
SAM (1976) 
SAM (1976) was reported to support and supplement Mujumdar (1976) and attack Gupta 
(1976a). SAM critiqued Gupta against his using the RBI data on M and H and at the same 
time claiming that RBI did not know the distinction between the two. SAM did not accept 
the following: (a) the multiplier theory was a universally acceptable theory of M 
determination; (b) there could be a mechanistic relationship between monetary base and 
M such as H theory, the determinants of M lied in real and monetary sectors as also in 
institutional structures and development, not only in monetary sector; (c) deposit 
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increases when M increases, deposit was dependent on overall level and growth of 
national income, level of interest rate, quantum of deficit financing etc; (d) forces, which 
increase M, also increase time deposits. There were following two loopholes in the trio: 
(a) they expressed their views, supported Mujumdar and attacked Gupta, but did not 
substantiate all these with evidences and thus the quality of their paper was not at par 
with either Swami (1978) or Chona (1976); (b) perhaps, they did not make comparative 
static analysis of the H model, any change in the real and other sectors could be 
accommodated in this theory; for example extension of banking facilities in the hitherto 
untapped areas would increase deposit collection and hence disposable H and thus would 
raise M. SAM emphasized on stability test of the coefficients in money multiplier and 
accurate forecasts of exogenous variables. This was the first time ever the stability test is 
mentioned. In their view multiplier might be useful for long run projection of M, but not 
for short run because in short run its coefficients could deviate from the long run trend. 
 
Madhur (1976) 
Madhur (1976) was reported to criticize all of Gupta (1976a), Mujumdar (1976) and 
SAM (1976); he criticized Gupta (1976a) because Gupta (1976a) did not address the 
problem of adjusting H though Gupta did it in one of his Delhi School of Economics 
Working Papers; he criticized Mujumdar’s summarizing of the multiplier theory by 
terming M as a highly stable function of H after H was adjusted against changes in the 
reserve ratio; he took to task SAM and Mujumdar when all of them took H to be RBI 
policy controlled; as per Madhur the fiscal policy determined H and RBI had very little to 
do there, RBI could at most change the reserve ratio and thus affect the adjusted H only 
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when banks did not fail to meet the RBI stipulated reserve ratio; finally he criticized 
SAM (1976) because (a) SAM declared on the one hand that derived data, not the 
primary data of RBI had analytical significance, whereas on the other hand supported 
Mujumdar, who always referred to primary data; (b) SAM misunderstood the multiplier 
theory because they could not realize that behavioural ratios like currency to deposit ratio 
in monetary economics were functions of real, monetary and structural variables; (c) 
SAM believed that the money multiplier was highly unstable in India, but Madhur proved 
the contrary empirically; and (d) in analyzing the effect of compulsory deposit scheme on 
bank money, SAM (1976) assumed m to be unity, but in Mujumdar’s (1976) article it is 
2.485 though unadjusted, as per SAM, RBI would already know the differences between 
H and bank money in terms of RBI credit to government and commercial bank credit to 
government respectively but in RBI’s so called total explanation of variations in M, H 
and ordinary bank money were mixed up and gave an indication of one to one 
correspondence between bank money and M. 
 
Gupta (1976b) 
Gupta (1976b) was reported to reply to Mujumdar (1976), SAM (1976), Khatkhate 
(1976) and Madhur (1976); Gupta’s complaint against Mujumdar was that the latter was 
not convinced that the RBI analysis was tautological and the latter’s main contention was 
that M in India was directly determined by the RBI, which was further confirmed by 
SAM, who said that RBI was directly determining the M by virtue of regular undertaking 
of credit planning and credit rationing; this was a wrong contention as per Gupta; RBI 
could not determine currency or what Mujumdar called primary money, not to speak of 
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credit or what Mujumdar called secondary money; therefore  RBI was very much in need 
of a theory with sufficient predictive power to explain the determination of components 
and totality of M, and money multiplier theory could fulfil all these needs; in any case 
RBI’s accounting table was of tautological character and as such did not have any 
explanatory or predictive power; again the multiplier referred to by RBI analyses 
involving distinction between M and money multiplier did not permeate entire RBI 
thinking on the subject. Gupta tried to disprove assertions of SAM and Mujumdar that the 
money multiplier was mechanistic by deriving the demand deposit multiplier from asset 
demand functions and a market equilibrium condition. Thus Gupta asserted that the 
multiplier theory offered a convincing behavioural explanation of the money supply 
process and changes and identified well-defined channels through which the influence of 
myriad of forces – economic, institutional and policy generated – operating on money 
supply, could be systematically analyzed as well as predicted. Here Gupta referred to 
Gurushree Swami’s unpublished research work, which explained (a) the link between 
currency ratio on the one hand and on the other holding of black money, spread of 
banking facilities in the rural areas, bazaar-bill rate, 9-month time deposit rate of banks 
etc; (b) the link between time deposit to demand deposit on the one hand and on the other 
two interest rate factors – the 12 month time deposit rate of banks and the rate on variable 
industrial securities, and (c) the link between reserve ratio on the one hand and on the 
other both interest rate factors and non-interest rate factors like shifts in deposits among 
scheduled non scheduled and state cooperative banks, structural changes within the 
scheduled banking sector in terms of redistribution of total deposits among banks of 
different sizes, stability in the banking system, liquidations and amalgamations of banks 
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etc. Gupta refuted Khatkhate and Mujumdar when they considered money multiplier to 
be influenced by changes in the value of statutorily required reserve ratio of banks 
because in his opinion changes in statutorily required reserve ratio changed disposable H, 
not mere H. Here he drew an analogy between the relationship between consumption 
expenditure and disposable income on the one hand and on the other the relationship 
between M and disposable H. In contrary to Mujumdar, Gupta asserted that RBI could 
not change money supply through changing statutory reserve ratio, therefore appropriate 
use of various control instruments like open market operations, changing the required 
reserve ratio and controlling RBI lending to central banks could alter the disposable H, 
not the money multiplier, whereas bank rate had very little effect on the money 
multiplier. Here again Gupta referred to Swamy’s regression analysis of available H on 
M for two separate periods: (a) 1951-52 to 1961-62 and 1962-63 to 1971-72 with R
2
 = 
0.988 and R
2
 = 0.999 respectively indicating highly significant regression coefficient of 
adjusted H in both the cases. Another point of Mujumdar and SAM against the multiplier 
theory that it attributed changes in money supply to monetary sector alone, was not true 
as per Gupta, but money supply was influenced by both real and monetary factors. Here 
Gupta reacted by identifying a channel present in the multiplier theory whereby 
autonomous changes in the demand for bank credit arising from autonomous changes in 
the real sector could be allowed to influence the multiplier and so money supply; here the 
importance of operation of the above channel was to deemed to be measured, which 
required developing a sufficiently complete and disaggregated model of determination of 
money supply and estimating money supply empirically. But Gupta thought that all these 
refinements would not add much to the explanatory and predictive power to the simple 
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multiplier theory. Gupta again opposed SAM, where SAM complained that Gupta denied 
the presence of any organic relationship between bank credit and money supply because 
presence of a third variable, the quantity of H, which was again subject to autonomous 
variations, caused an observed organic relationship between two variables volume of 
credit and volume of deposit; given a stable demand deposit multiplier, variations in H 
caused predictable changes in demand deposits as well as bank credit. SAM in their own 
illustration could not correctly establish the causal relationship between credit expansion 
and money supply expansion; here Gupta pointed out SAM’s failure to see the difference 
in terms of addition to H between deposit accretion and borrowings from central bank 
and SAM’s two contradictory statements, one where SAM made credit expansion 
dependent on deposit expansion and other where they made credit expansion a causal 
factor in money supply expansion. As per Gupta SAM’s paper was full of imprecise and 
confused statements and lack any hypotheses in the truest sense of the term and SAM did 
not understand the modus operandi of the compulsory deposit imposition. Actually as per 
Gupta compulsory deposits impounded H, because banks paid it to RBI through transfer 
of H, only kind of money RBI accepted and also because government decided not to 
borrow from the RBI; here M contracted because of reduction in H, but not because of 
postponement of addition to currency and demand deposit as per whether payments to 
employees are made through cash or check as per Gupta. Gupta also tried to disprove 
SAM’s (1976) immediate impact argument regarding the control of RBI credit to 
commercial banks and its effect on bank reserve. Gupta ended up with an expression of 
happiness with SAM and RBI for their agreement with Gupta (1976a) on qualitative 
difference between the effects of the RBI’s lending to government and commercial bank 
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lending to government on money supply because (i) SAM’s quotation from a RBI 
publication to the above effect, (ii) a small section on money multiplier being included in 
RBI Report on Currency and Finance. (iii) RBI’s Analysis of Money Supply II contained 
a simple discussion of the m theory. But still Gupta (1976b) was not fully happy, when he 
detected reluctance on part of some of the RBI economists to accept openly the m theory 
as the basis of official analysis of money supply. He advised them to master the 
multiplier theory or share their own theory with the academic community, but not to 
support RBI’s empty analysis.    
 
Chona (1976) 
Chona (1976) was reported to be a supplement to Gupta’s (1976b), except for the second 
paragraph in p 668, where Chona asserted the central bank’s “absolute control over its 
monetary liabilities”, which went against Gupta. Chona sought to examine the stability of 
the ratio of currency to M and the ratio of reserves to demand deposits. Chona (1976), 
following Ahrensdorf J. and S. Kanesa Thasan (1960), treated the changes in M caused 
by variations in monetary liabilities of the central bank (∆ML) and by fluctuations in 
money multiplier (∆Mk). ∆ML was further subdivided into changes due to net foreign 
assets of the central bank (∆Mf), to net credit to the government (∆Mcg) and to the 
policies followed by the central bank (∆Mp). Chona’s findings were as follows: (a) after 
identifying separately the components of changes in M attributable to ∆Mk and ∆ML and 
expressing them as percentages of M in the previous period in order to bring out the 
relative impact of changes in L and k on percentage change in M, the average k effect 
was found to range between 0.5% and 2.9% and the average L effect was found to range 
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between 5.6% and 11.6%; so there was a smaller impact of k on M compared to L
1
; the 
policy of monetary management in the inflationary situation should be to control L in 
order to check monetary expansion; (b) the effects of changes in currency ratio 
dominated the changes in M attributable to ∆Mk., the average effects of changes in the 
reserve ratio were rather insignificant, barring 1973, almost the entire variation in M 
attributable to ∆Mk was behavioural and not policy induced; (c) Amongst the non-
behavioural factors determining M, i.e. the components of ∆ML the most important was, 
by and large, ∆Mcg; (d) in a large number of years the policy induced changes in L 
tended to impart contractionary impulses to M in the opposite direction of the 
expansionary impulse caused by ∆Mcg, there emerged broadly, though not consistently, 
an inverse relationship between exogenous and policy induced changes in monetary 
liabilities of RBI. 
 
Swamy (1978) 
As per Swamy (1978), reportedly since 1975, when she had made the analysis of the 
sources of change in money supply, a considerable amount of discussion came up among 
some academicians and RBI staff on whether the H-M approach was appropriate or not 
for money supply analysis in India
2
. The RBI group appeared to feel that since supplies 
of both of reserve money and bank money and the behaviour of multiplier were fully 
controlled by RBI, there was no use of the multiplier approach, which paid importance to 
the behavioural aspect of public and commercial banks on the value of the multiplier and 
                                                 
1
 There were contradictions between the last statement of the last paragraph of Part II and the last statement 
of the first paragraph of Part III of Chona’s paper regarding the comparative strength of L effect and k 
effect on M. 
2
 The same claim is made by Gupta 1976b. 
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so on the supply on money. Referring to Cagan (1965), Courchene and Kelly (1971) and 
Gupta (1973) Swamy criticized the above attitude of the RBI group. Cagan (1965) related 
the sources of changes in H in USA to various incidents like Gold Mechanism after 1914 
and treasury operations. Courchene and Kelly (1966) related the supply of H in Canada to 
policy variables like full employment, price stability etc. Gupta (1976b) related the 
source of change in H to government borrowing in India. So Swamy argued that H-M 
approach could deal with the cases even where changes in H are not under the control of 
the central bank as it did in USA and Canada. For India Swamy empirically identified 
autonomous and passive sources of change in H. The autonomous sources were the 
results of autonomous decisions of the RBI and the passive sources were those not under 
the RBI control. Autonomous sources of change in H identified by Swamy were (i) 
changes in government securities held by the RBI due to open market operations, (ii) 
subscriptions to new loans of central government, (iii) purchase of securities from the 
public (i.e. the banks), and (iv) sale of securities to the public. Passive sources of change 
in H identified by Swamy were (i) decisions made by the public, i.e. net foreign exchange 
(forex in short) purchase from the RBI and borrowings of commercial and cooperative 
banks from the RBI; and (ii) decisions made by the government, i.e. changes in 
government securities held by the RBI due to the government borrowings from the RBI 
and government’s net forex purchase from the RBI. Swamy concluded that the RBI and 
Government clubbed together for policy purposes explained on average 68% of the 
changes H.  
 
Impact of Bank Credit on Money Supply 
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Bank credit is reported to be a useful indicator of real sector activity that affected money 
supply. In India reportedly one of the objectives of monetary policy is ensuring adequate 
credit flow to the productive sectors of the economy. RBI is reported to extend credit to 
the government by way of loans and advances and investments in government securities 
and to a little extent to the financial sectors including banks. The depository corporations 
such as commercial and cooperative banks are again reported to invest in government 
papers and other market instruments and extended credit to the commercial sector 
including non-depository financial corporations. The non-depository financial 
corporations are also reported to invest in government securities and extend credit to the 
commercial sector and to a limited extent to the banking sector by way of refinance. The 
role of bank credit in making the money supply endogenous is discussed in Das (2009). 
 
Rao, Venkatchalam and Vasudevan (1981) 
Rao et al (1981) was reported to contend that equilibration of supply and demand was 
done by allowing for change in nominal income given an exogenous forecast of real 
income which in turn affected the estimates of demand for currency and deposits. The 
forecasts of money supply were reportedly derived by an iterative solution of the entire 
model, which meant that all the relationships specified in the model were to be 
simultaneously satisfied. The model was reportedly simulated for the sample period and 
the annual predictions generated by the model were compared with actual values of 
monetary aggregates and the national income deflators for those years. The results were 
reportedly presented in two alternative models: Model A - in this model the equilibrium 
took place around narrow money and demand deposits were derived as a residual by 
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deducting estimated time deposits from aggregate deposits; Model B - in this model the 
equilibrium took place around broad money and time deposits were derived as a residual 
by deducting estimated demand deposits from aggregate deposits.  
 
Singh, Shetty and Venkatachalam (1982) 
While discussing on the issues of monetary policy Singh et al (1982) was reported to find 
that reserve money caused logarithm of narrow money. They did not forecast money 
supply. 
 
Rangarajan and Singh (1984) 
 
Rangarajan et al (1984) reportedly dealt with the relevance and nature of adjustment of 
reserve money for the purpose of publication of series of data on reserve money and used 
the new adjusted series to examine the lags in the impact of reserve money H on M.  As 
per Rangarajan et al in its unadjusted form, the impact of changes in cash reserve 
requirements (CRR) was captured in the multiplier; the impact of reserve money as an 
instrument of control could be understood easier if the effects of reserve requirement 
changes were included in the computation of the base; during the periods when legal cash 
reserve requirement was changed, the growth rate of a monetary base that incorporated 
the resultant impact would diverge compared with a series unadjusted for such changes. 
The results of this study indicated that in general changes in reserve money were useful 
and important guides to understand the behaviour of money supply.  
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Conclusion 
Before submission of Swamy’s PhD thesis in 1975, the multiplier approach to estimation 
and analysis of sources of high powered was not found in any of the monetary models 
developed in the context of India. The person to understand importance and applicability 
of the H-M Model in India after Swamy was S.B. Gupta, who admitted his sincere 
perusal of Swamy’s thesis in Gupta (1976b). Gupta’s work on Monetary Modelling 
before 1975, like Gupta (1973) did not speak of his awareness of the development of this 
model in monetary literature abroad. Again Gupta (1976a) had certain loopholes. He 
made contradictory statements – one in fourth paragraph of p125 and another in the first 
paragraph of p126. In the fourth paragraph of p125 he tells that banks’ credit to 
government reallocates money supply in favor of government leaving total money supply 
unchanged, whereas in the first paragraph of p126 he told, if government securities 
comprised a major chunk of assets in the bank’s asset portfolios then the reserve ratio 
would come down and money supply would go up since variations in reserve ratio 
influenced money multiplier adversely. Without rectifying the contradiction Gupta 
(1976a) reportedly took the Ministry of Finance, Government of India (GOI) to task 
when the latter declared government borrowing from banks and government borrowing 
from RBI substitutable in Economic Survey 1973-74. Gupta (1976a) repeated the first 
view that GOI’s borrowing from RBI increased H and hence raised M, whereas GOI’s 
borrowing from banks could not affect RBI and left total money supply unchanged. On 
the other hand Chona’s (1976) paper might be considered as an extension of Thasan and 
Ahrensdorf, (1960) in the Indian context. Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 in 
Kanesathasan and Ahrensdorf (1960) in the context of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Egypt, 
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Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines and United States 
found their Indian counterparts in Chona (1976). For India, separately, Chona (1976) 
identified behavioural factors and policy induced changes influencing money supply and 
lists them in Table 5. On the basis of the data presented in Chona’s (1976) paper, the 
stance of RBI’s monetary policy was found in the appropriate direction. 
After Gupta (1976b), the money multiplier was reported to be found in non-RBI 
monetary models explicitly in the works like Ahluwalia (1979), Madhur, Nayak and Roy 
(1982) and Chitre (1986), and implicitly in the works like Krishnamurty (1984), Pandit 
(1984), Chakravarty (1987), Nachane and Ray (1989), Jadhav and Singh (1990), 
Rangarajan and Ariff (1990), and in the RBI studies like Singh et al (1982) and 
Rangarajan and Singh (1984). There were, reportedly, attempts like Rao, Venkatchalam 
and Vasudevan (1981) to go beyond the multiplier approach.  Still the concept and use of 
multiplier is found to have relevance today e.g. Rath 2003. Further, the technique of 
forecasting was not reported to find priority in the research works of 1970s conducted 
after 1972 except for Swamy’s PhD thesis and Gupta (1973) involving the multiplier 
debate. A careful perusal of the papers on determination of money supply in India 
reportedly gives an understanding of the explanations regarding what are the sources of 
high-powered money, how the money multiplier works and what are the determinants of 
money supply, and reveals that money supply can reportedly be forecast either from the 
liability side, which is money multiplier approach or from the asset side, which is the 
balance sheet approach. It was advised by researchers that monetary forecasts are 
required for a variety of purposes. Decisions on monetary policies like cash reserve ratios 
and refinance of commercial banks by RBI must, by wisdom of researchers, be clearly 
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based on an analysis not only of monetary aggregates of the recent past but also future 
prospects. The same applies to measures concerning the structure of interest rates and the 
assessment of commercial banks credit budgets as per researchers. Forecasts of growth of 
bank deposits reportedly play an important role in estimation of resources available for 
financing investment and particularly of plan outlays in the public sector. The purpose of 
forecast is reported to have a bearing on the time horizon over which the forecast is to be 
made and hence on the methodology to be used, e.g., in the estimation of financial 
resources available for plan outlays one of the components is based of the growth of bank 
deposits. Here it is suggested by researchers to incorporate the following issues:         
It is also reported that the concept of residency may emerge in near future as one of the 
determining factors of money supply in India. The Working Group under the 
Chairmanship of Y. V. Reddy on Analytics and Methodology of Compilation of Money 
Supply reportedly introduced the concept of residency and recommended changes in the 
reporting system of commercial banks; residency was supposed to relate to the country in 
which the holder had a centre of economic interest; currency and deposits held by the non 
residents in the rest of the world sector would presumably be related to balance of 
payments considerations such as international capital flows rather than to the domestic 
demand for monetary assets or to the use of money in domestic transactions and should 
therefore be regarded as external liabilities to be netted from foreign currency assets of 
the banking system. The Group was reported to propose that, though there was a need to 
categorize deposit liabilities by residency it might not be appropriate to exclude all 
categories of non-resident deposits from domestic monetary aggregates as non-resident 
rupee deposits were essentially integrated into the domestic financial system and only 
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non-resident repatriable foreign currency fixed deposits should be excluded from deposit 
liabilities and treated as external liabilities; accordingly from among various categories of 
non-resident deposits at present only FCNR (B) deposits might be classified as external 
liabilities and excluded from domestic money stock. As per another reported proposal of 
the Group time deposits of resident should not include Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs) and 
India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) based on the residency criterion and exclude banks’ 
pension and provident funds because they were in the nature of other liabilities and were 
included under ‘other demand and time liabilities’; the new monetary aggregates like 
NM2 and NM3 were therefore based on the residency concept and hence did not directly 
reckon non-resident foreign currency repatriable fixed deposits in the form of FCNR(B) 
deposits, RIBs and IMDs.  
Finally, researchers suggested not to overlook the issue of stability of money multiplier. 
Rath (1999) is reported to find over the period 1980-98 instability in both of broad and 
narrow money multipliers; however over the part period 1980-90, Rath found M3 
multiplier stable; he argued that reasons for such stability might be financial liberalization 
witnessed in the economy since late 1980; the monthly data on Indian money multiplier 
showed that it was varying in the range of 2.17-3.72 with a mean value of 3.0; the 
volatility of the multiplier measured by its standard deviation, which declined during the 
1980s from the 1970s, however increased in the 1990s mainly due to frequent changes in 
the CRR; the movement in the broad money multiplier made the stability of the multiplier 
a key issue because it could not explain the long run relationship between the broad 
money and the monetary base. A more recent study by Jha and Rath (2003) covering 
three time periods April 1980 to March 2000 (Period 1), April 1980 to March 1990 
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(period 2) and April 1990 to March (Period 3) since financial market deregulation came 
in India was reported to find all monetary variables in their log level form to be I(1) with 
lags chosen as SBC/AIC criteria; this study conducted Granger-Engel co-integration tests 
using ADF test statistics and found that neither M3 nor M1 were co integrated in period 1 
indicating unstable multipliers; in period 2 however broad money and narrow money 
were cointegrated; in period 2 broad money and narrow money were found to be 
cointegrated with reserve money which was not the case in period 3 so much so that 
multipliers were stable in period 2 but not in period 3 because of financial liberalization 
in period 3.  
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